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NEW YORK PRACTICE COVERAGE
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the defendant in a subsequent suit. However, in Israel v. Wood
Dolson Co.,87 the Court of Appeals held that where the doctrine
of collateral estoppel is asserted defensively, "the test to be applied is that of 'identity of issues.' "88 In such a case the mutuality
requirement is abandoned.
While Israel only required that the issues in the subsequent
action be identical, the Court in Cummings not only noted an
identity of issues, but also an identity of parties. It seems, therefore, that the Court was reluctant to apply the "identity of issues"
test as the sole criterion for the defensive assertion of collateral
estoppel in negligence cases. There is a fundamental policy consideration behind this reluctance by the Court, which can be
illustrated by a situation wherein there is more than one possible
plaintiff. In such an instance, there is always the possibility .of a
collusive suit, wherein a favorable judgment obtained by the
defendant could be used to collaterally estop subsequent plaintiffs.
While Cummings does not overrule Israel,"" it evidences an
apparent reluctance on the part of the Court of Appeals to apply
the "identity of issues" test as the sole criterion for the defensive
assertion of collateral estoppel. It appears that future cases will be
decided on their own merits, within the guidelines set up by
Israel and Cummings. The test may very well now be "identity
of issues plus ......
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EViDENCE

CPLR 4504: Amendment.
The section, as amended, declares that a person authorized
"to practice medicine, registered professional nursing, licensed
practical nursing or dentistry" cannot disclose confidential information acquired from a patient while acting within his professional capacity.
CPLR 4533-a: Amendment.
As a result of this new rule, an itemized repair bill-which
is receipted and marked paid-for property damage to a motor
vehicle in an amount of less than three hundred dollars is now
prima facie evidence of the reasonable value of the repairs itemized
in an action or counterclaim for such damages.
The repair bill must be verified by a proper party. It must
state (1) that no refund has or will be made to the claimant,
87

1 N.Y2d 116, 134 N.E2d 97, 151 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1956).

881d. at

120, 134 N.E.2d at 100, 151 N.Y.S2d at 5. See The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice, 41 ST. JoHI'1's L. Rv. 121, 148 (1966).
89 It is to be noted that Chief judge Desmond, who wrote the majority
opinion in Cummings, concurred in the majority opinion in Israel.
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and (2) that the cost of the repairs itemized is usual and
customary. Finally, the bill must be served upon the adverse
party's attorney at least five days prior to the trial.
.ARTICLE 52-

ENFORCEMENT OF MONEY JUDGMENTS

CPLR 5201: Insurer's contractual obligation to defend and indemnify is a "debt" and capable of attachment.
CPLR 5201(a) provides that a money judgment can be
enforced against any debt, whether incurred within or without
the state or whether incurred by a resident or nonresident. There
is no express provision requiring that service of process be possible
on the party before the debt can be subject to enforcement, since
"jurisdiction over the judgment debtor or garnishee is an implicit
requirement for using any enforcement proceeding." 90
One area of litigation involving this section has been developing
a definition of the word "debt" in relation to the contractual
obligations of defendant insurance companies. 91 In Matter of
Riggle, 2 petitioner, a New York resident, was injured by decedent,
a resident of Illinois, in Wyoming. He moved to have an administrator of Riggle's property appointed in New York. Basing
its decision on Section 47 of the Surrogate's Court Act,93 the
Court held that even though no judgment had been obtained against
Riggle or his estate, he was considered a creditor, and the insurance carrier was held to be a debtor within the meaning of the
statute."
In Seider v. Roth,95 the plaintiffs, residents of New York,
were allegedly injured in an accident in Vermont through the
negligence of the defendant, a Canadian domiciliary. The defendant
was insured by a company doing business in New York, however,
the policy was issued in Canada. An order of attachment 8 directed
90 6 WEINSTEIx, KoRA

& MiLLER, Naw YORK CIVIL

(1965).
91 See also CPLR 6202, which provides

PRAcricE ff 5201.04

that "any debt or property

against which a money judgment may be enforced as provided in section
5201 is subject to attachment."

92 11 N.Y2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S2d 416 (1962).
93 This section provides that a debt owing to a defendant by a resident

of New York is regarded

as personal property

the situs of

which is

within the county where the debtor resides.
94Although not confronted with similar jurisdictional problems since
the accident occurred in New York, another court has stated that a nonresident insurer's "contractual obligation to defend and indemnify defendant
is a debt or cause of action capable of being attached . . . ." Fishman v.
Sanders, 18 App. Div. 2d 689, 235 N.Y.S2d 861 (2d Dep't 1962), rev'd on
other grounds, 15 N.Y.2d 298, 206 N.E2d 326, 258 N.Y.S.2d 380 (1965).
95 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).

91CPLR 6202.

